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 Interrogative suggestibility is the individual’s tendency to yield to misleading 
questions and negative feedback. Individuals who exhibit this tendency have been found 
to be more likely to falsely confess to a crime, a decision with often severe negative 
consequences. Many individual differences in cognition, emotion, and personality have 
been linked with interrogative suggestibility. These individual differences have also been 
found to be related to an individual’s decision-making ability. However, the relationship 
between interrogative suggestibility and decision-making has not been investigated. The 
current project sought to determine how decision-making abilities, cognitive ability, 
memory, and anxiety predict variability in interrogative suggestibility. Results indicate 
that cognitive ability is a strong predictor of interrogative suggestibility. Furthermore, 
cognitive ability significantly interacted with the decision-making ability of consistent 
risk perception in predicting suggestibility. Future research should focus on the 
underlying processes important for both suggestibility and decision-making as these both 













What is Interrogative Suggestibility? 
 Suggestibility is "the tendency of the individual to respond in a particular way to 
suggestions" (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 336). Interrogative suggestibility is "the extent to 
which, within a closed social interaction, people come to accept messages communicated 
during formal questioning, as the result of which their subsequent behavioral response is 
affected" (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986, p. 84).  
 There are two specific theoretical approaches to suggestibility. The first is the 
experimental approach, which focuses on explaining the conditions in which leading 
questions can affect the witnesses' accounts of an event. This approach is illustrated by 
the misinformation effect and false memory research of Elizabeth Loftus and colleagues. 
The second approach is the individual differences approach, which emphasizes the 
individual's ability to generate and use coping strategies when faced with uncertainty and 
expectations in an interrogative situation. This approach is exemplified by the 
Gudjonsson and Clark model (1986). The two research paradigms have shown 
differential relationships with other variables. For example, the former approach was 
found to be related to imagery ability and the latter was related to conformity (Eisen, 
Gomes, Lorber, Perez, & Uchishiba, 2013). The focus of the current project is on the 






 The Gudjonsson-Clark (1986) theoretical model of interrogative suggestibility 
suggests four main features of this concept. First, interrogative suggestibility involves 
questioning within a closed social interaction (i.e. a police interrogation). Second, the 
questioning is focused on past experiences and events. Third, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty in the situation and the degree of uncertainty is related to the cognitive ability 
of the individual. Fourth, interrogative suggestibility often involves high stress situations 
with important consequences for the individual and others (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
 The model also emphasizes two components of suggestibility: leading questions 
and negative feedback. The first component, leading questions, relates to the reliability of 
the individual's answers to questions designed to bias the respondent in a certain 
direction. The second component, negative feedback, relates to the tendency for the 
individual to shift, or change, his or her answers in response to negative feedback from 
interrogators following the individual's initial, and likely accurate, responses 
(Gudjonsson, 2003). 
 According to the Gudjonsson-Clark model, interrogative suggestibility depends 
on the individual's ability to generate and implement coping strategies in the face of the 
uncertainty and expectations inherent in an interrogative situation. Uncertainty, 
interpersonal trust, and expectations are essential prerequisites to interrogative 
suggestibility. Uncertainty means that the individual is not certain about the right answer 
to the question. This can lead to the individual being compliant—accepting a suggestion 
from a leading question despite knowledge of its inaccuracy in order to please the 
interrogator—or suggestible—accepting the suggestion as accurate or at least plausible. 





interrogator is trustworthy are more likely to accept suggested information than those 
who are suspicious of the interrogator's motives. Furthermore, the more accurate the 
individual's memory is for the event, the more likely he or she will detect an 
interrogator’s attempt to influence the responses. Expectations within this situation keep 
individuals from responding with "I don't know" type responses. There is a general 
reluctance to respond with uncertainty because people believe they must provide a 
definite answer, they should know the answer to the question, and they are expected to 
know and give the answer (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
 Given the right combination of uncertainty, interpersonal trust, and expectations, 
anyone would be susceptible to suggestions. However, the theory also emphasizes the 
individual’s use of coping strategies to deal with the uncertainty, trust, and expectations 
of the situation. For example, an individual who is able to view the situation objectively 
and critically may not be as likely to answer a question unless he or she is absolutely 
certain about the facts of the situation. On the other hand, an individual who has an 
unrealistic appraisal of the situation and reluctance to admit that one's memory is 
imperfect is more likely to be suggestible (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
 Feedback received by the individual is also important to interrogative 
suggestibility. Feedback is defined as "a signal communicated by an interrogator to a 
witness, after he/she has responded to a question or a series of questions, intended to 
strengthen or modify subsequent responses of the witness" (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986, 
pp. 93-94). This feedback may be either positive or negative and implicit or explicit. For 
example, positive implicit feedback may include providing the individual with 





desired or acceptable answers with encouragement or praise. Negative explicit feedback 
may include the interrogator stating that the individual has made mistakes in his/her 
responses. Gudjonsson and Clark (1986) suggest that negative feedback is particularly 
influential on individual's behavior by making them shift, or change, their answers and 
increases their subsequent responding to misleading questions (Gudjonsson, 1984a). 
Negative feedback following a series of questions is particularly difficult for individuals 
to cope with because they are not sure which answers should be changed (Gudjonsson & 
Clark, 1986). 
 Individuals may respond with suggestible or resistant behavior to feedback, and 
this response is partly dependent on the individual's previous responses to misleading 
questions and the coping strategies used to handle the uncertainty and expectations of the 
situation. For example, suggestible responding may be reinforced with positive feedback 
leading to a cognitive set that is more susceptible to further suggestions in questioning. 
Similarly, resistant responding can be reinforced by positive feedback leading to more 
resistant responding. However, resistant responding is most likely to be followed by 
negative feedback from the interrogator. Individuals who have used a critical or 
suspicious coping strategy may reject the negative feedback and continue to exhibit a 
resistant cognitive set that is unlikely to yield to suggestion. If the individual accepts the 
negative feedback, uncertainty is likely to increase which also increases anxiety and 
decreases self-esteem. These changes make it more likely that the individual will use 
external information as a coping strategy. This can ultimately lead to a more suggestible 
cognitive set. Finally, suggestible responding may be followed by negative feedback. 





may follow suggestible responses when the individual has not answered with the desired 
alternative in false forced choice rather than yes-no questions (Gudjonsson, 2003).  
The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales 
 Based on the previously described theoretical work, Gudjonsson constructed and 
validated the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1997), which assess 
an individual's responses to leading questions and negative feedback while recalling a 
fictitious event previously described in a narrative. The participant is read a narrative 
about a fictitious robbery. He or she is then asked to recall the narrative. Free immediate 
recall is followed by a 50-minute delay. After the delay, the participant is asked to free 
recall the narrative again (delayed recall). After the delayed recall, the participant is 
asked 20 specific questions, 15 of which are misleading (i.e. false or inaccurate 
information, false forced-choice). After answering the 20 questions, the participant is told 
that he or she has made several errors and must answer the questions again. The 
participant is then asked the same 20 questions a second time.  
 The GSS provides several scores important for measuring suggestibility such as 
immediate and delayed recall, the number of misleading questions the individual 
responds to in a suggestible manner both before and after negative feedback (Yield 1 and 
Yield 2, respectively), the number of times the individual changes his or her answers to 
misleading questions (Shift), a total suggestibility score based on the two previous 
measures (Total Suggestibility), and major memory distortions (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
These scores are discussed more specifically in the methods section.    
 The GSS comes in two forms, GSS 1 and GSS 2. The two forms were developed 





reflects the forensic nature of the instrument and uses a narrative that describes a 
fictitious robbery, while the GSS 2 has a narrative of non-criminal content that is 
generally simpler and better for use with children and adults with learning disabilities 
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999; Gudjonsson, Murphy, & Clare, 2000). 
Gudjonsson (2003) suggests that the two scales may be used interchangeably. Total 
Suggestibility scores on the two scales have been found to correlate highly at about .90 
with both normal and forensic samples (Gudjonsson, 1987a).  
 The scales have also shown adequate test-retest reliability with correlations 
around .80 in both normal and forensic samples in time periods ranging from one day to 
18 months (Gudjonsson, 1997). This indicates support for the stability of interrogative 
suggestibility over time. The inter-rater reliability has also been found to be about .90 for 
both Shift (i.e. changes in answers to misleading questions) and Total Suggestibility 
scores (Richardson & Smith, 1993; Clare, Gudjonsson, Rutter, & Cross, 1994; 
Gudjonsson, 1997). 
 Factor analysis has found that Yield 1 (i.e. yielding to misleading questions) and 
Shift measures of the GSS load on two factors. This indicates the presence of two 
independent components of interrogative suggestibility. The first is described as the 
extent to which people give in to misleading questions, and the second is described as the 
individual's response to interrogative pressure (Gudjonsson, 2003; Scullin & Ceci, 2001).  
 Although the normative data provided in the manual includes samples from only 
Iceland and Great Britain, a forensic sample of 334 juveniles and adults in the United 
States showed results consistent with those found in the British and Icelandic samples 





with a small, non-forensic U.S. sample, no age, gender, or occupational differences on 
the GSS 2 were found, and IQ was significantly negatively correlated with all 
suggestibility measures. Differences between the UK and U.S. samples were noted, with 
the UK sample scoring significantly higher on the tendency to yield to misleading 
questions and the US sample scoring significantly higher on the tendency to change 
answers in response to interrogative pressure (Pollard, Trowbridge, Slade, Streissguth, 
Laktonen, & Townes, 2004). All samples have shown that Yield 1 scores are consistently 
negatively correlated with intellectual ability, while Yield 2 and Shift scores are more 
consistently negatively associated with emotional and personality disturbance (Frumkin 
et al., 2012).  
False Confessions 
 Gudjonsson's primary reason for developing his theory was to develop a measure 
that could be used in forensic assessment to measure an individual's susceptibility to 
suggestion in false confession cases (Gudjonsson, 2003). The few studies that have 
investigated suggestibility and false confession suggest a relationship. Sigurdsson and 
Gudjonsson (1996) used a sample of prison inmates who claimed to have falsely 
confessed to a crime. No differences in suggestibility were found between these inmates 
and a control group of inmates. However, when the researchers only included those 
inmates who described a coerced-internalized false confession, in which they came to 
believe they committed the crime at some point during interrogation and later realized 
they did not commit the crime, these inmates showed higher suggestibility scores than 





misleading questions, change their answers to questions when asked a second time, and 
exhibit memory distortions.  
 Redlich and Goodman (2003) attempted to induce a false confession in a group of 
12 to 26 year olds. Subjects were told not to hit a specific button or the computer would 
crash, but the computer crashed for all subjects in the experiment without any of the 
subjects hitting the button. The dependent measures were the subject's willingness to sign 
a false confession statement that he or she hit the button and the computer crashed, the 
subject's sharing of the experience with another experimenter in which he/she indicated 
that he/she hit the button, and the subject's memory of whether or not he/she hit the 
button. Over half of the participants signed the false confession, nearly half of those who 
signed internalized the false confession (i.e. told another experimenter they had hit the 
button when recalling the event), and about one third of those who signed the false 
confession exhibited distorted memory for hitting the button. The dependent measures 
were significantly related to scores from the GSS including a tendency to yield to leading 
questions and change one's answer when asked the question a second time. 
 By reviewing the legal, psychological, and psychiatric components of alleged 
false confession cases, Gudjonsson and MacKeith (1988) determined that interrogative 
suggestibility and compliance were the two most important characteristics involved in 
these cases. Comparing defendants who persistently denied involvement in a crime with 
those who had initially confessed and then retracted the confession, Gudjonsson (1984b) 
found that the latter group was more suggestible than the former as measured by the GSS. 
They were more likely to change their answers to misleading questions following 





up study, Gudjonsson (1989) matched the two groups on age, intelligence, memory, and 
sex. The results were similar to that of the first study, with the alleged false confessors 
being more suggestible than those who consistently denied involvement in the crime.  
Suggestibility has also been shown to differentiate better than intelligence among alleged 
false confessors, forensic patients who had not retracted their confessions and defendants 
who denied involvement but were convicted by other evidence (Gudjonsson, 1991).  
These studies indicate that individuals who are more suggestible are more likely 
to falsely confess to crimes. This tendency places suggestible individuals at risk for 
several consequences including wrongful conviction. Although the commonsense belief 
is that innocent individuals do not confess to crimes, almost 25% of wrongful convictions 
exonerated by DNA evidence included a false confession (Kassin, 2008). Bedau and 
Radelet (1987) considered 350 homicide and rape cases of wrongful conviction in the 
United States and found that 14% of these convictions included a false confession.  More 
recently, Garrett (2011) examined the cases of 250 individuals exonerated due to the 
work of the Innocence Project, a national litigation and public policy organization that 
relies on DNA evidence to exonerate wrongfully convicted individuals and works to 
reform the criminal justice system. Sixteen percent of these cases included a false 
confession, and in about 40% of these cases the individual was either mentally ill or 
developmentally disabled.  Almost two thirds of those who falsely confessed to the crime 
went to trial, and none of the confessions were successfully challenged.   
 Confessions have a disruptive effect on evidence and witnesses. When a 
confession is present, research indicates that previously inconclusive evidence such as 





& Ben-Shakhar, 1994; Dror & Charlton, 2006). In experimental conditions, 60% of 
participants changed their identification of a suspect after being told another suspect had 
confessed. The participants did so with high degrees of confidence in their decision 
(Hasel & Kassin, 2009). Data from cases of false confession from the Innocence Project 
showed similar errors in 78% of the cases (Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner, 2012). These 
results indicate that false confessions can lead to devastating and long-lasting 
consequences for the individual.   
Individual Differences in Interrogative Suggestibility 
 Interrogative suggestibility, as measured by the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, 
has been found to be related to a variety of individual difference variables including 
compliance, acquiescence, coping strategies, self-esteem, anxiety, cognition, and 
memory.  
 Personality and emotion-focused individual differences. 
 Suggestibility is often confused with compliance. The important distinction 
between the two constructs is that suggestibility includes acceptance of the information as 
truth while compliance is the tendency of the individual to agree with the information for 
some secondary gain but not accept it as truth (Gudjonsson, 2003). Compliance may be 
thought to include two aspects: protection of self-esteem and avoidance of conflict 
(Gudjonsson, 1989, 1997). Gudjonsson (1989) created a self-report measure, the 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS), in which the individual answers true/false 
statements about how he or she typically interacts with others. Suggestibility and 
compliance are also different from acquiescence, which may be defined as the tendency 





can be thought of as a personality trait including aspects of submissiveness and eagerness 
to please (Finlay & Lyons, 2001) 
 Suggestibility as measured by the GSS is weakly associated with acquiescence 
(Gudjonsson, 1986, 1990; Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995). Gudjonsson (2003) suggests that 
individuals experience the uncertainty and low self-esteem that arises in the interrogative 
situation as unpleasant, which may cause them to reduce their uncertainty and increase 
self-esteem by answering affirmatively. Using other instruments to measure 
suggestibility, researchers have shown acquiescence to be related to the tendency to 
accept misleading information (Eisen, Morgan, & Mickles, 2002). 
 Theoretically, compliance should not be highly correlated with suggestibility 
because it does not include acceptance of the misleading information and is generally 
independent of intelligence (Gudjonsson, 1990). However, Gudjonsson (1990) found 
suggestibility measured by the GSS to be significantly positively correlated with 
compliance measured by the GCS. Similarly, in a factor analysis of the GSS, GCS, and 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R), Gudjonsson (1990) found 
compliance and suggestibility to load on the same factor, while acquiescence loaded 
highly on the verbal and non-verbal intelligence factors. In an adolescent forensic sample, 
Richardson and Kelly (2004) also found that compliance scores from the GCS were 
highly correlated with the tendency to yield to misleading questions, indicating that those 
who are more compliant also tend to be vulnerable to the influence of misleading 
questions.  
 Research has supported the role of coping strategies in suggestibility. Using 





experimental interrogative situation, Gudjonsson (1988a) found three specific types of 
coping strategies: active-cognitive, active-behavioral, and avoidance coping. Active-
cognitive coping strategies include active management of thoughts and appraisal of the 
situation. Subjects who used this coping strategy had self-statements such as "I cannot be 
expected to know all the answers." Active-behavioral strategies include behavioral 
attempts to deal directly and critically with the situation. The self-statements of subjects 
in this group often included, "I stuck with what I knew." Avoidance coping includes 
avoiding critical appraisal of the situation. Subjects in this group often had self-
statements such as "I did not want to look stupid" or "I changed answers I was not certain 
about." Those who used the avoidance coping strategy were found to be more suggestible 
than those who used the active cognitive or behavioral strategies, as measured by the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales. Others have also found suggestibility to be positively 
related to emotion-focused coping strategies (Howard & Hong, 2002).  
 Self-monitoring is an important component of coping with adverse situations. 
Bain, Baxter, and Ballantyne (2007) found those that were high in self-monitoring, as 
measured by a self-report self-monitoring scale, exhibited significantly higher scores than 
those low in self-monitoring on the Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, and Total Suggestibility 
measures from the GSS 1. This indicates that those who show increased attention to 
social cues, are highly concerned about managing their internal states, tend to be more 
attentive to demand characteristics, and are more easily influenced by others show higher 
levels of suggestibility. High self-monitors tend to adapt their behavior to fit the 





 Self-esteem is also an important component of the Gudjonsson-Clark model. In 
general, research indicates that self-esteem is negatively correlated with suggestibility. 
Individuals with self-reported low self-esteem scored significantly higher than those with 
high self-esteem on the Shift measure of the GSS indicating that those with low self-
esteem are vulnerable to interrogative pressure. Those with low self-esteem also showed 
lower recall scores than those with high self-esteem (Bain, Baxter, & Fellowes, 2004). 
 Using a sample of delinquent boys, Gudjonsson and Singh (1984) measured self-
esteem using the Coopersmith Behavior Rating Form and the GSS 1. Those with low 
self-esteem as rated by the staff members of the assessment center were more likely to 
change their answers following negative feedback. Self-esteem, as measured by the 
Semantic Differential Scales, was found to be negatively correlated with suggestibility 
when subjects were administered the GSS for the first time, but the correlation was 
reduced when they were administered the GSS a second time. This may suggest that 
manipulation of self-esteem via negative feedback may have a greater impact on 
suggestibility for inexperienced or naive individuals (Singh & Gudjonsson, 1984). 
Similarly, research has shown that the greater the individual's perceived discrepancy 
between self and interrogator in regard to potency and competence, the more likely the 
individual was to be suggestible (Gudjonsson & Lister, 1984). Some have found no 
relationship between self-rated self-esteem and suggestibility, but this may be due to the 
reliability of the self-esteem measure used in the study (Smith & Gudjonsson, 1995). 
 Baxter, Jackson, & Bain (2003) found a significant main effect for self-esteem, 
with those with higher self-esteem scoring lower on the GSS 1. However, they also found 





individuals with high self-esteem showed less suggestibility when facing a friendly 
versus an abrupt interviewer while those with low self-esteem showed higher 
suggestibility scores when facing a friendly versus abrupt interviewer. These results 
suggest that individuals with low self-esteem are particularly susceptible to suggestibility 
when faced by an interviewer whom they find friendly and perhaps want to please. 
However, these results have not been unanimously supported. Bain, Baxter, and Fellowes 
(2004) did not find self-esteem to interact with interviewer behavior in effecting 
suggestibility. Also, Drake, Bull, and Boon (2008) did not find a significant relationship 
between self-esteem and GSS measures. 
 Self-esteem is closely associated with locus of control. Individuals who believe 
they are powerful and competent may tend to have an internal locus of control—they 
perceive outcomes in their environment to be contingent on their own behavior. This is 
opposed to an external locus of control in which the individual believes outcomes are 
largely due to environmental factors. Research has shown that those with an external 
locus of control are more likely to be suggestible (Gudjonsson & Lister, 1984).  Those 
with an internal locus of control and confidence in their own abilities are less likely to 
yield to leading questions (Liebman et al., 2002).   
 Trait anxiety, as measured by self-report questionnaires, has been found to be 
poorly correlated with suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1983; Haraldsson, 1985). However, 
evidence suggests that state anxiety is an important predictor of interrogative 
suggestibility. State anxiety, as measured by the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory both 
before and after administration of the GSS, was found to be correlated with the 





suggestible following negative feedback (Gudjonsson, 1988a). These correlations were 
particularly strong when using the post-GSS administration measure of state anxiety 
(Gudjonsson, 1988a). Wolfradt and Meyer (1998) found that psychiatric patients with 
anxiety disorders were significantly more suggestible as measured by the GSS 2. The 
patients were more likely to yield to leading questions and change their answers when 
asked the questions a second time. The patients also exhibited higher state anxiety scores 
than the normal controls.  
 There have been some conflicting results when using state-trait anxiety 
inventories. For example, Smith and Gudjonsson (1995) found that state anxiety 
measured immediately after GSS administration was not related to suggestibility scores, 
but confabulation as measured by free recall of the GSS narrative at one-week follow-up 
was significantly correlated with state anxiety at the initial administration. They also 
found anxiety to be more highly correlated with Yield 2 and Shift scores than Yield 1 
scores, which supports the role of negative feedback in the Gudjonsson-Clark model of 
interrogative suggestibility. Results such as these indicate that the timing of anxiety 
measurement is important as it is the negative feedback component of the GSS that is 
anxiety-provoking (Gudjonsson, 2003).   
 Gudjonsson (1988a) investigated the relationship between suggestibility and 
social-evaluative anxiety using the Fear of Negative Evaluation and Social Avoidance 
and Distress Scales (Watson & Friend, 1969). All GSS scores correlated positively with 
fear of negative evaluation scores indicating that those who fear social evaluation also 
tend to be more suggestible, but there were no significant correlations between 





 Researchers have found a small correlation between suggestibility and social 
desirability as measured by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Richardson & 
Kelly, 2004) and the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. An early study by 
Gudjonsson (1983) found a small, positive correlation between suggestibility as 
measured by the GSS and the lie scale of the EPQ. Haraldsson (1985) found similar 
results using other social desirability measures. However, interrogative suggestibility as 
measured by the GSS 2 was not found to be related to impression management or self-
deception enhancement (Gudjonsson & Young, 2008). These results indicate that the 
relationship between interrogative suggestibility and socially desirable responding is 
tentative and dependent on the measurement of social desirability.  
 Impulsivity and assertiveness have also been investigated in relation to 
suggestibility. The individual's tendency to change his or her answers to misleading 
questions when asked the question again was found to be positively correlated with 
impulsivity as measured by the Arrow-Dot Test (Gudjonsson, 1984c). Assertiveness, as 
measured by the Rathus Assertiveness Scale, has been found to be negatively correlated 
with suggestibility as measured by the GSS 1 (Gudjonsson, 1988a).  
 Intellectual and cognitive individual differences. 
 Strong empirical evidence exists indicating a negative relationship between 
intellectual functioning and interrogative suggestibility. Using the WAIS-R, Gudjonsson 
(1983) found full scale IQ, verbal intelligence, and performance intelligence to be 
negatively related to the tendency for individuals to yield to misleading questions and 
change their answers when asked the question a second time. One study investigating the 





Arrangement, Similarities, and Comprehension showed the highest negative correlations 
with suggestibility, which the authors interpreted as suggestibility being associated with 
logical reasoning, sequential thought, and social awareness (Gudjonsson, 1990).   
 While the relationship between intelligence and suggestibility is strong, several 
studies also indicate that this relationship is impacted by range effects. Studies using 
subjects of above average intelligence have failed to find significant results, but those 
using subjects of average or below average intelligence and studies acquiring a large 
range of intelligence scores found a significant relationship between suggestibility and 
intellectual functioning. Gudjonsson (1988b) found similar results in a forensic and non-
forensic sample, but the relationship was only significant when considering the full range 
of scores or intelligence scores below 100; the relationship was not significant for scores 
above 100. Gudjonsson (2003) suggests that these results indicate the need to use 
appropriate samples when attempting to test hypotheses regarding suggestibility and 
intellectual functioning. However, others have not found range effects to be important in 
the relationship between IQ and suggestibility, supporting a negative correlation between 
IQ and GSS scores throughout the full range of IQ scores (Søndenaa, Rasmussen, 
Palmstierna, & Nøttestad, 2010). 
 Memory is an important component of intellectual functioning, and it has been 
shown to correlate negatively with suggestibility. Individuals with poor memory tend to 
be more suggestible. Several studies found significant negative correlations between the 
immediate and delayed recall portions of the GSS and the suggestibility scores from the 
same measures (Gudjonsson, 1988; Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995; Sharrock & Gudjonsson, 





between memory and interrogative suggestibility has also been shown in adolescents, 
with those with poor visual memory being more likely to yield to leading questions and 
change answers in response to interrogative pressure (Callicchia & Santostefano, 2004).  
 The relationship between memory and suggestibility may be more nuanced than 
simple absolute memory. For example, individuals who showed more rapid memory 
deterioration between immediate and delayed recall, as measured by the percentage of 
immediate versus delayed recall on the GSS 1, were more likely to be suggestible than 
those who showed less deterioration but equally poor recall (Gudjonsson, 1983). 
Physiological data suggest that interrogative suggestibility reflects individual differences 
in post-retrieval memory processes. Using event-related potential (ERP) measurement 
and visual representations of the GSS 1 and GSS 2, researchers found that interrogative 
suggestibility was not indicated by differences in ERP measures of attention (Howard & 
Chaiwutikornwanich, 2006). 
  Cognitive load has also been used to explain the relationship between 
interrogative suggestibility and memory. When instructed to remember a series of five 
numbers during the administration of the GSS, subjects who performed this concurrent 
task exhibited a tendency to yield to misleading questions and change answers to 
interrogative pressure compared to subjects who did not complete this task. However, 
these differences did not reach statistical significance (Drake, Lipka, Smith, & Egan, 
2013).  
 Intelligence and memory, although correlated, appear to contribute individually to 
suggestibility. Gudjonsson (1983) found that immediate and delayed recall added to the 





Gudjonsson (1993), via path analysis, found that delayed memory and intelligence scores 
individually and together explained variability in suggestibility. Similarly, after 
accounting for age, gender, IQ, and memory, Gudjonsson and Young (2010) found 
confabulation to significantly predict Total Suggestibility on the GSS 2. This suggests 
that confabulation, the tendency to replace gaps in memory with false information 
believed to be true, is important for understanding the relationships among IQ, memory, 
and suggestibility.   
 Field dependence, a cognitive dimension defined by the reliance on information 
from the frame or field rather than the object, has been found to be positively correlated 
with suggestibility as measured by the GSS. Individuals who tend to be field dependent 
also tend to be more suggestible (Blagrove, Cole-Morgan, & Lambe, 1994; Singh & 
Gudjonsson, 1992). A potential explanation for this relationship notes that field 
dependent individuals may have difficulty with the critical analysis necessary in an 
interrogative situation (Singh & Gudjonsson, 1992). Contrary to these findings, others 
have suggested that field dependence may be a coping mechanism for some individuals 
in the interrogative situation, but have failed to find a relationship between field 
dependence and performance on the GSS (Drake & Bull, 2011).  
 Demographic and situational variables. 
 There appears to be a small, insignificant gender difference in suggestibility as 
measured by the GSS. In general, women tend to be slightly more suggestible than men, 
but this difference is dependent on the type of information presented. Men and women 
tend to remember different details about a situation and this influences their responses to 





shown to be more suggestible than women, but this may also be due to the tendency for 
women to have higher immediate recall scores. Among an adult sample, age related 
differences in suggestibility have been found. Older adults showed a greater tendency to 
yield to misleading questions. However, older and younger adults did not differ in the 
susceptibility to change their answers following interrogative pressure. After controlling 
for age, memory and self-assessment of one's memory were significant predictors of the 
tendency to yield to misleading questions for the group of older adults (Polczyk, 
Wesołowska, Gabarczyk, Minakowska, Spuska, & Bomba, 2004). Studies comparing 
juveniles with adults have shown that age is negatively correlated with all suggestibility 
measures, with juveniles exhibiting greater yield 1, yield 2, shift, and total suggestibility 
scores (Frumkin et al., 2012).  
 Instructional manipulations have been found to impact suggestibility. For 
example, those told that they should be able to answer all the questions on GSS 1 
responded in a more suggestible manner than those who were told they were not expected 
to be able to give definite answers to all the questions and those who were given no 
specific instructions regarding performance expectation (Gudjonsson & Hilton, 1989). 
Similar results were found when only two groups, high and low expectations, were 
included (Hansdottier et al., 1990). Warning subjects that the questions are misleading 
has also been shown to reduce suggestibility (Boon & Baxter, 2000; Warren, Hulse-
Trotter, & Tubbs, 1991). 
Suggestibility and Decision-Making 
 The processes underlying interrogative suggestibility are very similar to those 





interrogative suggestibility, uncertainty and expectations play an important prerequisite 
role in eliciting suggestibility. These features are also important in decision-making. 
Decision-making is a response to a certain situation in which the decision-maker faces 
many possible actions, considers the probabilities of outcomes for each action, and 
evaluates the potential consequences of the outcomes (Hastie & Dawes, 2001).  
 Individuals employ a number of strategies for coping with a decision situation. 
One strategy is to use heuristics—strategies that allow for efficient decision-making but 
do not always produce an optimal decision. While these strategies are robust in decision-
making situations in that they usually produce good decisions without much cost or 
effort, they also produce errors and biases (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). In using heuristics, 
important information regarding the situation is often ignored, making the decision prone 
to error (Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Sanna, Small, & Cook, 2004). The use of heuristics in 
the decision-making context appears to be similar to an avoidant (Gudjonsson, 1988a) or 
emotion-focused coping strategy (Howard & Hong, 2002) within an interrogative 
situation. 
The Gudjonsson-Clark model proposes that uncertainty related to the individual's 
cognitive ability is an important feature of interrogative suggestibility. Decision-making 
situations also include a high degree of uncertainty, and decision-making competence—
the ability of the individual to use normative decision-making skills accurately and 
consistently in the decision-making process—has been found to be an important 
individual difference factor that impacts decision outcomes. It includes the ability to 
properly use heuristics and other decision-making short-cuts, but it also includes the 





(Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). Decision-making competence directly 
addresses decision-making skills in regard to accuracy and consistency (Parker & 
Fischhoff, 2005).   
Just as interrogative suggestibility is believed to be related to an individual's 
cognitive skill and ability to develop and engage in cognitive coping strategies, decision-
making competence incorporates four basic skills: assessing beliefs, assessing values, 
combining beliefs and values to identify choices, and meta-cognitive understanding of 
one’s abilities (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). The skill of assessing beliefs entails accurately 
judging the probability of the occurrence of an event. For example, an adequate ability to 
assess beliefs would result in an accurate estimate of the probability of getting the flu in 
the next two months. The assessing values skill requires being receptive to relevant task 
changes while ignoring irrelevant changes. For example, an individual who makes the 
same decision regarding ground beef whether it is presented as 80% lean or 20% fat is 
effectively utilizing this skill. This skill also includes the ability to ignore past costs and 
simply focus on future outcomes. For example, a good financial decision-maker would 
not consider the money already spent on a project but would focus on the probability of 
future success or failure of the project. The integration skill (i.e. combining beliefs and 
values) requires accuracy and consistency in applying decision rules. For example, when 
choosing a new laptop computer, an individual may have certain requirements, or rules 
(i.e. low cost, large screen, average processing speed), which should lead to a specific 
outcome. Consistent and accurate application of such rules should lead to the correct 
option. Finally, meta-cognitive understanding is conceptualized as having accurate 





answer to a true/false question would be accurate in indicating that she is 50% confident 
in her decision. However, if she was simply guessing and stated that she was 75% 
confident, she would be overconfident and exhibiting poor meta-cognitive skills in the 
decision-making domain (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).  
Considering these decision-making skills within an interrogative situation 
indicates that each is likely related to an individual's tendency to be suggestible. If one is 
unable to accurately judge the probability of an event, he or she may be exceptionally 
impacted by negative feedback. Accuracy in probability judgment is negatively impacted 
by anxiety and memory, both of which have been positively and negatively related to 
suggestibility, respectively (Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995; Gudjonsson, 1988; 
Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995; Sharrock & Gudjonsson, 1993). This is probably also true in 
regard to the skill of assessing values. Being easily swayed by contextual information is 
often detrimental to decision-making, and this would appear to be particularly true in 
interrogative situations. As noted previously, individuals who tend to be field dependent, 
or rely on the context rather than the object for information, are often more suggestible 
(Blagrove, et al., 1994; Singh & Gudjonsson, 1992) perhaps due to poor critical analysis 
(Singh & Gudjonsson, 1992). Accuracy and consistency are crucial in interrogative 
situations. The ability to integrate information into an accurate picture of an event, 
without being influenced by leading questions or negative feedback would require 
adequate decision-making skills. Finally, the meta-cognitive understanding of one's 
confidence in a decision or piece of information is essential in interrogative situations. 
Recognizing and monitoring one's confidence is important for avoiding influence of 





active-cognitive coping strategies, which include management of expectations and one’s 
confidence, were less likely to be suggestible (Gudjonsson, 1988a).    
The four basic skills important to decision-making competence also reflect the 
ability to avoid common decision-making obstacles. The skills manifest themselves in 
decision-making tasks such as resistance to framing, consistency in risk perception, 
applying decision rules, under/overconfidence, resistance to sunk costs, and recognizing 
social norms. These skills make up the Adult Decision-Making Competence battery 
(ADMC; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
The framing effect occurs when the decision-maker formulates different decisions 
in regard to the same information presented in opposing frames. This effect would 
include an individual responding with a different answer to a misleading question, or a 
question framed in a different way. For example, one may decide that 80% lean ground 
beef is better than 20% fat ground beef even though they are the same. In most 
experimental manipulations of this effect, the problem statement is presented in two 
different frames in which the wording is slightly different but the information is the same 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2001). The general decision trend is to make riskier decisions in regard 
to negative frames and less risky decisions in regard to positive frames (Fagley, Miller, & 
Jones, 1999). People are more likely to take risks to avoid a loss and less likely to take 
risks to achieve a gain (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). The framing effect 
offers support for the idea that decision-making is not always logical and systematic and 
is biased by surface features of the situation. 
Risk perception is believed to be related to the availability heuristic—judging 





accurate risk perception due to the availability of commonly occurring events in memory, 
it is also subject to individual differences in memory content and contextual factors (i.e. 
exposure to uncommon risks) that can distort risk perceptions (Herwig, Pachur, & 
Kurzenhauser, 2005). For example, one may decide that getting attacked by a shark is 
very likely because of the number of news stories about shark attacks even though the 
risk of this occurring is actually low. Using the availability heuristic to judge risk can 
lead to incorrect estimates of risk because individuals base the estimates on instances in 
memory which often do not match the instances in reality (Herwig et al., 2005). Affect is 
also important in probability judgments of risk because it relies on memory and the 
affective associations of memory. For instance, individuals are often more concerned 
with the perceived possibility than the actual probability of an event, which helps explain 
why perception of risk is often inconsistent (Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 
2005).  Within an interrogative situation, the individual may be uncertain of his or her 
memory content and use an avoidance or emotion-focused coping strategies leading to 
poor probability judgment and increased suggestibility.  
Applying decision rules assesses the accuracy of decisions and the individual’s 
ability to integrate information in order to make a decision. An individual’s ability to 
apply decision rules accurately has been found to be highly correlated with general 
cognitive ability, suggesting that this component of decision-making requires adequate or 
superior cognitive ability to be performed successfully (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
This is perhaps similar to an individual's ability to implement adequate coping strategies 





Under/overconfidence measures the accuracy of an individual's recognition of the 
extent of his or her own knowledge (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). An individual's level 
of certainty is an important aspect of the Gudjonsson-Clark model of interrogative 
suggestibility, with those who are less certain about their answers being more likely to be 
suggestible (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986). It may be that those who tend to be under or 
over confident in their decisions may be particularly likely to show a tendency toward 
suggestibility.  
 Resistance to sunk costs assesses the ability to ignore past costs in a decision. 
Unrecoverable costs related to a past decision should be ignored because they cannot be 
changed. Decision-making is best when focused on future consequences (Bruine de Bruin 
et al., 2007). Within an interrogative situation, being able to monitor the impact of past 
answers on future answers would seem important for maintaining consistent answers 
following negative feedback and the second presentation of the misleading questions. 
Recognizing social norms assesses the individual's ability to accurately assess 
peer social norms. A comparison is made between what the individual believes to be 
acceptable behavior and the rate at which the individual believes his or her peers are 
engaging in these behaviors (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). One's ability to remain 
consistent and accurate within a decision-making or interrogative situation may depend 
on one's understanding and expectations of normative behavior in these situations. Within 
the Gudjonsson-Clark model (1986), the individual's expectations of the interrogative 
situation are important for determining the individual's level of suggestibility.   
While decision-making competence focuses on the processes and skills of 





making, thus supporting the idea that better decision-making skills will often result in 
better decisions (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). In addition, 
decision-making competence is associated with real-world outcomes of decision-making, 
thus increasing its ecological validity beyond simple laboratory tasks. Among a sample of 
adolescents, decision-making competence has shown negative relationships with 
“maladaptive” risk behavior (i.e. antisocial disorders, externalizing behavior, 
delinquency, substance use, sexual activity) and positive relationships with positive 
family and peer environments (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). Perhaps decision-making 
competence is also related to suggestibility in that those with greater decision-making 
competence are less likely to be suggestible or to find themselves in interrogative 
situations.  
The interrogative situation is often a very risky situation with important 
consequences for the individual. Many decision-making tasks used in research 
incorporate an element of risk in assessing the adequacy of decision-making skill. The 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been widely used to assess decision-making ability. It 
was developed to identify decision-making deficits in individuals with damage to the 
prefrontal cortex (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Barry & Petry, 2008). 
Participants are required to selects cards from four decks that vary in probability and 
magnitude of rewards and punishments. Decks which provide immediate large gains also 
provide net losses over time (Franken & Muris, 2005). Less risky decision-making on the 
IGT is considered to be better performance (i.e. better decision-making). Research has 
indicated gender differences in IGT performance, with men performing better than 





performance on the IGT improves over multiple trials, but the gains in performance 
continue to occur for less well educated participants who perhaps rely more on emotion-
based decisions (Evans, Kemish, & Turnbull, 2004). Those who engage in avoidant or 
emotion-focused coping strategies in an interrogative situation may perform better on this 
task of decision-making. Understanding the relationship between a risky, emotion-based 
task and suggestibility is important for understanding the decisional, emotional, and 
cognitive processes underlying suggestibility.  
  Just as the Gudjonsson-Clark model relies on individual differences as 
explanations for suggestibility, decision-making has also been explained from an 
individual differences approach. Individual performance on decision-making tasks tends 
to be consistent across tasks (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Stanovich and West (1998) 
found significant correlations among a variety of reasoning and decision-making tasks 
including tasks similar to those in the Adult Decision-Making Competence battery and 
tasks measuring the use of heuristics. Decision-making tasks have also been found to be 
related to other individual difference variables such as cognition and anxiety. 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) found that individuals performed consistently across 
the tasks within their Adult Decision-Making Competence battery. These tasks included 
resistance to the framing effect, the recognition of social norms, under or overconfidence 
in one’s decision, the ability to adequately apply decision rules, consistency in perceiving 
risk across different situations, and resistance to the consideration of sunk costs (i.e. 
disregarding the amount of money already spent in an endeavor when considering 





decision-making are not random, but that individual’s portray consistent differences in 
how they reason and make decisions (Stanovich & West, 1998).  
Performance on decision-making tasks is also related to individual differences in 
basic cognitive ability, indicating an underlying, consistent difference in reasoning 
abilities (Stanovich & West, 1998). Reasoning abilities, which strongly reflect the basic 
skills of accuracy and consistency in assessing beliefs and values, integrating 
information, and monitoring cognition necessary for decision-making, have been found to 
be related to individual differences in cognitive ability as measured by SAT score, 
performance on Raven’s Matrices, and reading comprehension tests (Stanovich & West, 
1998). Parker and Fischhoff (2005) found measures of resistance to framing and applying 
decision rules to be significantly correlated with measures of both verbal ability and non-
verbal ability as measured by subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-
Revised (WISC-R; i.e. vocabulary, block design, picture arrangement, and object 
assembly). The ADMC, as an overall measure of decision-making competence, has been 
found to be significantly correlated with the verbal and non-verbal measures of cognitive 
ability. Similarly, in the validation process of the ADMC, better performance on each 
task was related to higher levels of cognitive ability (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
Anxiety is also related to decision-making. Social anxiety and trait anxiety have 
been found to be related to risk-avoidant decision-making. Furthermore, the relationship 
between trait anxiety and risk-avoidant decision-making was found to be relatively 
unchanged when controlling for negative mood (Maner et al., 2007).  High trait anxiety is 
also correlated with impaired decision-making as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task 





disordered patients to those with other psychological disorders (i.e. mood and learning), 
the anxiety patients exhibited more risk avoidance than both clinical groups as well as a 
non-clinical control group (Maner et al., 2007). Individuals with high trait anxiety also 
tend to use evidence that confirms their hypotheses and disregard evidence that 
disconfirms their hypotheses when making adjustments to their previous hypothesis 
(Bensi, Giusberti, Nori, & Gambetti, 2010).  
Research has noted that state anxiety may better account for the association 
between trait anxiety and decision-making. For example, Bensi et al. (2010) found that 
trait anxiety was negatively correlated with the amount of evidence requested to make a 
decision. However, state anxiety was also negatively correlated with the amount of 
evidence requested. When it was entered into the model, the relationship between trait 
anxiety and evidence needed for a decision was no longer significant. The variance of 
trait anxiety was better accounted for by state anxiety. This is similar to the relationship 
between state anxiety and suggestibility, with high state anxiety, and not trait anxiety, 
being related to increased suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1988a; Smith & Gudjonsson, 
1995).   
The Current Project 
 The present project sought to understand the relationship between interrogative 
suggestibility and decision-making as measured by the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, 
the Adult Decision-Making Competence battery, and the Iowa Gambling Task. 
Understanding the relationship between these individual differences is important for 
understanding the general decision-making abilities of individuals who tend to be 





a false confession, an important real-world decision with significant consequences. 
However, minimal empirical research has focused on the general decision-making 
abilities of individuals who are and are not suggestible. It is important to understand the 
relationship between these processes as a means of appropriate assessment and 
intervention in forensic and clinical applications.  
 The proposed project sought to determine the presence of a relationship between 
interrogative suggestibility and decision-making as measured by the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scales and multiple decision-making measures. It was hypothesized that 
performance on decision-making tasks would predict suggestibility in such a way that 
those who performed poorly on decision-making tasks would be more likely to be 
suggestible. Given the relationship of decision-making and suggestibility with other 
factors such as intellectual ability and anxiety, it was also proposed that these variables 


















 One hundred and thirty-seven undergraduates from the University of North 
Dakota participated in the study. They were given course credit for their participation. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 60 with a mean age of 21.16. One hundred and 
fifteen women and 22 men completed the study. The sample included mostly freshmen 
(N=43) and sophomores (N=45) with fewer juniors (N=18), seniors (N=16), and students 
beyond the fourth year of undergraduate study (N=10). Five participants did not indicate 
their educational level. In regard to ethnicity, the sample was primarily White (N=124, 
90.5%), followed by American Indian/Alaska Native (N=4, 2.9%), African-American 
(N=3, 2.2%), Hispanic (N=3, 2.2%), and Asian/Pacific Islander (N=3, 2.2%). In regard to 
ethnicity, the sample was generally representative of the undergraduate population at the 
university (Office of Institutional Research, 2014).  
Measures 
 The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1997) assess an 
individual's response to leading questions and negative feedback while recalling a 
fictitious event. The participant is read a narrative about a fictitious robbery. He or she is 
then asked to recall the narrative. Free immediate recall is followed by a 50-minute delay 





free recall the narrative again (delayed recall). After the delayed recall, the participant is 
asked 20 specific questions, 15 of which are misleading (i.e. have false or inaccurate 
information, presented in a forced choice between two incorrect options). After 
answering the 20 questions, the participant is told that "You have made a number of 
errors. It is therefore necessary to go through the questions once more, and this time try to 
be more accurate" (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 363). The participant is then asked the same 20 
questions a second time. Although the GSS 1 and the GSS 2 show similar psychometric 
properties, the original GSS 1, with forensic-related content, will be used in the proposed 
study.   
 The GSS1 yields several scores including immediate recall, delayed recall, yield 
1, shift, yield 2, total suggestibility, and confabulation.  
Immediate Recall is a measure of the participant's immediate verbal recall of the 
narrative. Scores range from 0 to 40, with an average score of 21 (standard 
deviation of 7) for individuals of average intelligence.  
Delayed Recall measures the participants delayed verbal recall for the narrative 
after a 50 minute delay. Scores range from 0 to 40 with a mean of 19 for 
individuals of average intelligence.  
Yield 1 is a measure of the number of suggestions the subject yields to prior to 
negative feedback based on their answers to the 15 misleading questions. Scores 
range from 0 to 15, with a mean of 4.6 (standard deviation of 3) for normal 
subjects.  
Shift is a measure of the number of times the subject makes a distinct change in 





participants can change their answers on both the misleading and non-misleading 
questions. The mean shift score for normal subjects is about 2.9 with a standard 
deviation of 2.5.  
Yield 2 is a measure of the number of leading questions which the participant 
yields to after negative feedback. Yield 2 is usually one or two points higher than 
Yield 1.  
Total Suggestibility is the sum of Yield 1 and Shift, and gives an estimate of the 
subject's overall level of suggestibility. The mean total suggestibility score for 
normal subjects is 7.5 with a standard deviation of 4.6.  
Confabulation is a measure of memory processing problems in which people 
replace memory gaps with imaginary experiences that they believe to be true. 
This includes major distortions of the narrative during the free recall parts of the 
GSS. More specifically, confabulation includes distortions—a major change in 
the details of an existing idea—and fabrications—the addition of a new or novel 
element to the narrative (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
 The Adult Decision-Making Competence (ADMC) measure is used to assess 
decision-making competence (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Following from the 
development of the Youth Decision-Making Competence measure, the ADMC includes 
tasks related to skills which are necessary for normatively competent decision-making. 
Across nearly 100 total items this measure includes six tasks: resistance to framing, 
recognizing social norms, under/overconfidence, applying decision rules, consistency in 
risk perception, and resistance to sunk costs. Internal consistency, test-retest reliability, 





unified construct of decision-making competence. The ADMC also shows significant 
predictive validity in that is has been found to be associated with better decision 
outcomes (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
The resistance to framing task includes 14 problems of two types. The first type 
requires the participant to indicate his or her relative choice between two options. For 
example, the problem states that a pesticide is threatening the lives of 1,200 endangered 
animals; the participant must then indicate his or her preference on a 1 (definitely would 
choose A) to 6 (definitely would choose B) scale with Option A resulting in 600 animals 
being saved for sure and Option B resulting in a 75% chance 800 will be saved and a 
25% chance that no animals will be saved. Other item contexts include tax laws, disease 
outbreak, and investment in the stock market; the exact quantities and probabilities in 
each scenario also vary (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
The second type of problem in this task requires the participant to indicate his or 
her judgment on a 1 (definitely no) to 6 (definitely yes) scale in regard to a product or 
situation. For example, presented with the information that 35% of graduating seniors say 
they have never cheated during their college career, the participant is asked, “how would 
you rate the incidence of cheating at your university?” Other contexts include condom 
effectiveness, test performance, and cancer treatment. The resistance to framing items are 
repeated later in the survey, but the frames are reversed to reflect a negative frame. For 
example, 35% of those who did not cheat becomes 65% who did cheat, and the options in 
regard to the first example become certain death for 600 animals if Option A is used and 





lost if Option B is used (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Good decision-making would be 
indicated by consistent choices between the two presentations of the same information.   
The 20-item consistency in risk perception task asks the participant to indicate his 
or her estimate as to the chance of a specific event happening to him or her at two points 
in the future. First, participants indicate the probability of each event occurring in the 
next year, and then they are asked to indicate the likelihood of each event occurring in the 
next five years. Examples of such events include getting in a car accident, dying from any 
cause, dying in a terrorist attack, and being a victim of robbery (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2007). Good decision-making would be indicated by equal or higher estimates for the 
events occurring in the next 5 years than for events occurring in the next year.   
 The 10 item applying decision rules task requires the participant to choose which 
of five DVD players the hypothetical individual consumer would buy. The DVD players 
are described in regard to the four unique qualities—picture quality, sound quality, 
programming options, reliability of brand—on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). 
All of the DVD players are equally priced. For example, the participant would read the 
following statement, “LaToya only wants a DVD player that got a ‘Very High’ rating on 
Reliability of Brand,” and then choose the DVD player (A, B, C, D, or E) which he or she 
believes best suits LaToya’s desire. Better decision-making includes choosing the correct 
DVD player depending on the desired qualities presented in the scenario.   
 The under/overconfidence task includes 34 items and requires the participant to 
judge whether a statement is true or false and then indicate his or her level of confidence 
ranging from 50% (just guessing) to 100% (absolutely sure). Some statements include 





improve memory;” and “meditation slows the heart rate” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
Better performance on this task is indicated by the minimal difference between the 
individual's mean confidence rating and his or her actual performance, or percent correct.  
 The resistance to sunk costs task contains 10 items which present choices between 
two options. The participant is asked to indicate his or her relative preference on a 1 
(definitely would choose A) to 6 (definitely would choose B) scale. For example, when 
presented with a choice between continuing to participate after painful injury in either a 
bowling club, which costs $50, or a tennis club, which costs $200, the participant is asked 
to indicate his or her preference between 1 (most likely to play tennis) and 6 (most likely 
to play bowling). Other contexts include buying a ring, giving a speech, and learning to 
play a musical instrument (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Better performance on this task 
is indicated by a higher score, or more resistance to sunk costs, because the higher rating 
for each item is associated with discontinuing the behavior in which the person has made 
a greater investment and choosing a new behavior that is more desirable for other 
reasons. 
 The recognizing social norms task measures the ability of the individual to 
adequately assess peer social norms. It contains 16 items pertaining to the individual’s 
beliefs regarding certain activities and his or her estimate of the proportion of peers, out 
of 100, who “would say it is sometimes OK” to do specific activities such as smoking, 
fighting, stealing, returning phone calls, and spending time with friends. Respondents 
first respond to the 16 questions regarding their beliefs about the acceptability of actions 
and then respond on a 1 to 100 scale in increments of 10 in regard to the proportion of 





between judged proportion and actual proportion, which is based on the responses of the 
sample.  
 The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, et al., 1994) is a computerized decision-
making task which measures risky decision-making. For the IGT, higher quality 
decisions are associated with less risk-taking. During the task, participants select cards 
from four decks. Each deck of cards has a different distribution of monetary gains and 
losses: two decks have negative expected value (i.e. high gains of $100 per trial but also 
infrequent high losses) and two decks have positive expected value (i.e. low gains of $50 
per trial and relatively low losses). Adaptive performance requires remembering the 
payoffs and losses to identify the decks with the positive expected value. Participants 
completed a total of 100 trials (Henninger, Madden, and Huettel, 2010). A total score is 
calculated by taking the total number of cards selected from the advantageous decks and 
subtracting the total number of cards selected from the disadvantageous decks (Bechara 
et al., 1994). 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, 
& Jacobs, 1983) is a brief, 20-item self-report inventory that measures the individual's 
current anxiety (state) and stable anxiety tendency (trait). The measure is the most 
frequently used measure of anxiety in the literature (Groth-Marnat, 2009). It has shown 
adequate test-retest reliability of about .73 to .86 for periods of 30 to 60 days. As 
expected, the test-retest reliability of state anxiety shows a lower range of about .36 to 
.51. Internal consistency has also been shown to be adequate with coefficients ranging 





The Vocabulary subtest of the fourth edition of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS-IV) is a 30 item measure of verbal ability. Participants are asked to provide 
definitions for the presented vocabulary words which become increasingly more difficult 
(Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009). Of all the WAIS-IV subtests, Vocabulary provides the 
best estimate of overall cognitive ability. In factor analytic studies, it consistently yields 
the highest factor loading on g, general intelligence (Sattler & Ryan, 2009).    
 The Visual Puzzles subtest of the fourth edition of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS-IV) requires the participant to view a completed puzzle and select three 
responses that combine to form the puzzle within a specific amount of time (i.e. 20 to 30 
seconds). It measures spatial visual-perceptual reasoning and assess nonverbal reasoning, 
mental transformation, processing speed, spatial ability, and attention. Visual Puzzles is 
considered a fair measure of g; 45% of the variance is this subtest is attributed to g. It has 
an average loading of .81 on the perceptual reasoning factor (Sattler & Ryan, 2009). 
 The Verbal Paired Associates subtests of the fourth edition of the Wechsler 
Memory Scales requires the participant to learn a list of orally presented word pairs and 
recall the second word of the pair immediately and after a delay of 20 to 30 minutes. It is 
a measure of simple short-term and long-term memory. The subtest has shown good 
internal consistency (.76) and substantial correlation with similar instruments (Wechsler, 
2009). 
Procedures 
 After giving informed consent, participants were read the GSS narrative and 
completed the immediate recall portion. After approximately a 50 minute delay, during 





(ADMC), they were administered the delayed recall and 20 questions portion of the GSS. 
They were then administered the following tasks: STAI, WAIS-IV Vocabulary, WMS-IV 
Verbal Paired Associates I, IGT, WAIS-IV Visual Puzzles, and WMS-IV Verbal Paired 
Associates II. Upon completion of all tasks, participants were debriefed regarding the 
purpose of the study and were given additional information regarding follow-up 







 The primary analyses were conducted using a series of multiple regression 
analyses. The predictor variables included state anxiety from the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-S), immediate recall of Verbal Paired Associates from the WMS-IV 
(VPA), and an estimate of full scale IQ using the scaled scores from Vocabulary and 
Visual Puzzles subtests from the WAIS-IV (FSIQ-E). Sattler and Ryan (2009) note this to 
be one of the ten best two-subscale estimates of full scale IQ. The following decision-
making tasks were also included as predictors: the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), 
Resistance to Framing (RTF), Under/Overconfidence (UOC), Applying Decision Rules 
(ADR), Consistency in Risk Perception (CRP), Resistance to Sunk Costs (RSC), and 
Recognizing Social Norms (RSN). Criterion variables included three measures from the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales: Yield 1, Shift, and Total Suggestibility. Means and 
standard deviations for each of the 10 predictors and three criterions are presented in 
Table 1.  
 When using multiple regression analysis, the predictors must fulfill the 
assumption of independence. Regression coefficients can become unstable if the 
predictor variables are too highly correlated. Knight (1984) recommends a correlation of 
0.80 as an unacceptably high correlation between predictor variables. The bivariate 





of these correlations among the predictor variables indicates an acceptable level of 
collinearity with no correlations over 0.30. Measures of multicollinearity (VIF and 
tolerance) did not reach levels to indicate collinearity among any of the predictors with 
no tolerance values below 0.70 and no VIF values above 1.40.  
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Predictor and Criterion Variables 
 Mean Standard Deviation Range 
Total Suggestibility 11.29 4.86 0.00 – 26.00 
Yield 1 6.31 2.67 0.00 – 12.00 
Shift 5.01 3.51 0.00 – 20.00 
IGT 9.25 28.42 -44.00 – 88.00 
RTF 0.96 0.44 0.00 – 2.64 
UOC 0.92 0.06 0.75 – 1.00 
ADR 0.74 0.14 0.33 – 1.00 
RSC 3.52 0.47 2.20 – 4.60 
CRP 0.72 0.10 0.35 – 0.95 
RSN 0.23 0.07 0.11 – 0.51 
VPA 10.73 3.04 4.00 – 19.00 
FSIQ-E 102.47 13.46 70.00 – 139.00 
STAI-S 94.74 11.67 76.00 – 134.00 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Resistance to Framing (RTF), Under/Overconfidence (UOC), Applying 
Decision Rules (ADR), Consistency in Risk Perception (CRP), Resistance to Sunk Costs (RSC), 
Recognizing Social Norms (RSN), Verbal Paired Associates (VPA), Full Scale IQ Estimate (FSIQ-E), 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-State (STAI-S) 
  
 The ten predictor variables were entered into a simultaneous multiple regression 
analysis and each was tested after all other variables were in the regression equation. The 
analyses were conducted separately for each criterion and the results are presented in 
Tables 3, 4, and 5. The reported slope coefficient estimates the amount of change in the 
suggestibility measure associated with one unity change in the predictor variable. The 
beta weight is a standardized slope coefficient that allows a comparison of the predictive 
strength of the predictor variables. The squared semi-partial, or part, correlation 
represents the proportion of variance in the suggestibility measure accounted for by each 
of the predictor variables after all other variables were in the regression equation. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlations of Predictor and Criterion Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Yield 1 --             
2. Shift .23** --            
3. Total Sugg. .72** .84** --           
4. FSIQ-E -.29** -.19* -.30** --          
5. VPA -.25** -.19* -.27** .25** --         
6. STAI-S -.04 .02 -.01 -.10 .01 --        
7. IGT -.11 -.12 -.14 .18* .24** .03 --       
8. RTF .05 .10 .09 -.15 -.06 .01 -.13 --      
9. UOC .03 .07 .07 .02 .10 -.01 -.07 .03 --     
10. ADR -.14 -.24** -.25** .31** .22* .05 .38** -.23** -.05 --    
11. CRP -.08 -.11 -.13 .05 .17* -.13 .02 -.13 -.01 .22** --   
12. RSC -.13 .02 -.06 .23** .03 -.13 .08 -.04 .05 .29** .22** --  
13. RSN -.20* .03 -.08 .04 .14 .11 .04 -.03 .04 -.05 -.07 .09 -- 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Resistance to Framing (RTF), Under/Overconfidence (UOC), Applying Decision Rules (ADR), Consistency in Risk Perception 
(CRP), Resistance to Sunk Costs (RSC), Recognizing Social Norms (RSN), Verbal Paired Associates (VPA), Full Scale IQ Estimate (FSIQ-E), State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory-State (STAI-S) 
** Correlation is significant at .01 level (two-tailed) 














 The results of the analysis of Total Suggestibility indicate that the overall model 
was significant, R2 = .166 , R2adj = .099 , F(10, 126) = 2.499 , p = .009. The summary of 
the regression coefficients presented in Table 3 indicates that the full scale IQ estimate 
(FSIQ-E) was the only significant predictor at the .05 level (β = -.218, p = .017). As 
FSIQ-E increased, Total Suggestibility decreased, indicating that those with higher 
intelligence are less likely to be suggestible. Verbal Paired Associates (VPA) approached 
significance (β = -.173, p = .055). As memory performance on VPA increased, total 
suggestibility decreased, indicating that those with better memory are less likely to be 
suggestible.  
Table 3. Regression Results for Total Suggestibility 
 
 B β T Part r 
FSIQ -.079 -.218 -2.427** -.198 
VPA -.277 -.173 -1.938* -.158 
STAI-S -.009 -.023 -.238 -.022 
IGT -.001 -.009 -.097 -.008 
RTF .073 .007 .077 .006 
UOC 6.482 .075 .912 .974 
ADR -4.682 -.138 -1.406 -.114 
CRP -3.476 -.074 -.840 -.068 
RSC .510 .049 .546 .044 
RSN -4.474 -.062 -.739 -.060 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Resistance to Framing (RTF), Under/Overconfidence (UOC), Applying 
Decision Rules (ADR), Consistency in Risk Perception (CRP), Resistance to Sunk Costs (RSC), 
Recognizing Social Norms (RSN), Verbal Paired Associates (VPA), Full Scale IQ Estimate (FSIQ-E), 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-State (STAI-S) 
*** Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
* Significant at .10 level 
 
 As IQ has often been found to be a strong predictor of performance on the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale and decision-making tasks, it is possible that the 
decision-making measures moderate the relationship between FSIQ-E and Total 





effects of FSIQ-E and the seven decision-making tasks and an interaction between  FSIQ-
E and one of the seven decision-making tasks were used to test this prediction. The 
interaction of FSIQ-E and performance on Consistency in Risk Perception (CRP) was 
significant in predicting variability in Total Suggestibility. Post-hoc analysis of the 
simple slopes of Total Suggestibility on FSIQ-E at the mean performance on CRP and 
one standard deviation above and below the mean indicated that suggestibility decreases 
as FSIQ-E increases but only for those who performed at the mean (b1 = -.097, t(127) = -
3.069, p < .05)  or one standard deviation above (b1 = -.161, t(127) = -3.609, p < .05)  on 
CRP (see Figure 1). Higher scores on CRP indicate better performance on this task or 
more consistency in perceiving risk across situations. The relationship between FSIQ-E 
and suggestibility was not evident for those who showed poor CRP performance.  
Figure 1. Interaction Results for Total Suggestibility  
Figure 1. Post hoc analysis of the relationship between FSIQ-E and Total Suggestibility at high (+1 SD), 
mean, and low (-1 SD) CRP.  Relationship is represented by plotting values of Total Suggestibility at high 




































 The results of the analysis of Yield 1 indicates that the overall model was 
significant, R2 = .154 , R2adj = .087 , F(10, 126) = 2.291 , p = .017. The summary of the 
regression coefficients presented in Table 4 indicates that the full scale IQ estimate 
(FSIQ-E) was again the only significant predictor at the .05 level (β = -.230, p = .012), 
and Verbal Paired Associates (VPA) approached significance (β = -.153, p = .091). Again 
the predictive relationships indicate that as intelligence and memory increase, the 
tendency to yield to misleading questions decreases. These results indicate that 
Recognizing Social Norms (RSN) also approached significance (β = -.160, p = .062). As 
performance on this task increased, the tendency to yield to misleading questions 
decreased. Participants who were better able to accurately recognize social norms and 
normative peer beliefs showed a decreased tendency to yield to misleading questions.  
Table 4. Regression Results for Yield 1 
 
 B β t Part r 
FSIQ -.046 -.230 -2.547** -.209 
VPA -.135 -.153 -1.703* -.140 
STAI-S -.013 -.056 -.664 -.054 
IGT -.002 -.019 -.213 -.017 
RTF -.074 -.012 -.141 -.012 
UOC 2.52 .053 .643 .053 
ADR -.173 -.009 -.094 -.008 
CRP -1.410 -.054 -.616 -.051 
RSC -.313 -.055 -.606 -.050 
RSN -6.308 -.160 -1.885* -.154 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Resistance to Framing (RTF), Under/Overconfidence (UOC), Applying 
Decision Rules (ADR), Consistency in Risk Perception (CRP), Resistance to Sunk Costs (RSC), 
Recognizing Social Norms (RSN), Verbal Paired Associates (VPA), Full Scale IQ Estimate (FSIQ-E), 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-State (STAI-S) 
*** Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
* Significant at .10 level 
 
 Due to the predictive power of FSIQ-E on Yield 1, the interactions of FSIQ-E 





procedure described previously. Again, the interaction between FSIQ-E and Consistency 
in Risk Perception (CRP) was the only interaction to reach significance. Post-hoc 
analysis of this interaction showed that FSIQ-E was significantly negatively related to the 
tendency to yield to misleading questions, but only for those who performed in the high 
range of CRP (b1 = -.098, t(127) = -2.58, p<.05). Higher FSIQ-E is related to decreased 
likelihood of yielding to misleading questions but only for those individuals who are 
exceptionally good at consistently perceiving risk.  
Figure 2. Interaction Results for Yield 1 
Figure 2. Post hoc analysis of the relationship between FSIQ-E and Yield 1 at high (+1 standard deviation), 
mean, and low (-1 standard deviation) CRP.  Relationship is represented by plotting values of Yield 1 at 
high (+1 standard deviation), mean, and low (-1 standard deviation) values of FSIQ-E. Analysis adapted 
from Myers, Well, & Lorch (2010). 
 
 The results of the analysis of Shift indicate that the overall model was not 
significant, R2 = .103 , R2adj = .032 , F(10, 126) = 1.449 , p = .167. The summary of the 
regression coefficients presented in Table 5 indicates that none of the predictor variables 






















.073). This relationship indicates that as performance on the ADR task increases, the 
tendency to shift responses following negative feedback decreases. As the ability to apply 
decision rules and logic increases, the tendency to change responses to questions 
following negative feedback decreases. As none of the predictors were significant at the 
.05 level, no interactions were analyzed.  
Table 5. Regression Results for Shift 
 B β t Part r 
FSIQ -.031 -.120 -1.290 -.109 
VPA -.135 -.117 -1.261 -.106 
STAI-S .006 .019 .221 .019 
IGT .000 .000 .002 .000 
RTF .172 .021 .243 .021 
UOC 3.845 .062 .724 .061 
ADR -4.492 -.184 -1.805* -.152 
CRP -2.010 -.059 -.650 -.055 
RSC .856 .114 1.226 .103 
RSN 1.361 .026 .301 .025 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Resistance to Framing (RTF), Under/Overconfidence (UOC), Applying 
Decision Rules (ADR), Consistency in Risk Perception (CRP), Resistance to Sunk Costs (RSC), 
Recognizing Social Norms (RSN), Verbal Paired Associates (VPA), Full Scale IQ Estimate (FSIQ-E), 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-State (STAI-S) 
*** Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
















 The primary results indicate that intellectual ability is highly predictive of 
performance on Total Suggestibility and the Yield component of suggestibility, but it is 
not predictive of performance on the Shift component of suggestibility. Also, verbal 
memory approached significance as a predictor of both Total Suggestibility and Yield. 
Overall, those with higher intelligence estimates and better verbal memory performance 
showed lower levels of suggestibility and decreased tendency to yield to misleading 
questions. However, neither intelligence estimates nor verbal memory showed a 
relationship with the tendency to shift answers following negative feedback. Also, neither 
state anxiety nor any of the decision-making tasks significantly predicted performance on 
suggestibility, yield, or shift. 
 These results are generally consistent with previous research that suggests a 
strong relationship between intelligence and suggestibility. Previous research indicates a 
strong negative relationship between intellectual ability and interrogative suggestibility. 
Gudjonsson (1983, 1990) has consistently found full scale IQ as measured by the WAIS-
R to be negatively related to total suggestibility and the tendency to yield to misleading 
questions. Others have also supported a strong negative relationship across a full range of 
IQ scores (Søndenaa, Rasmussen, Palmstierna, & Nøttestad, 2010). Similarly, Frumkin 
and colleagues (2012) found intellectual ability to be more closely related to the tendency 





feedback. This is consistent with the present findings that FSIQ-E predicted performance 
on Yield but not Shift performance.  
 Memory has also been a consistent predictor of suggestibility across multiple 
studies with the general conclusion that memory is negatively correlated with 
suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1987b; Gudjonsson, 1988; Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995; 
Sharrock & Gudjonsson, 1993). The current results show a consistent pattern with 
previous research indicating that while intelligence and memory are related, they appear 
to contribute individually to the prediction of suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1983; Sharrock 
& Gudjonsson, 1993). The full scale IQ estimate was consistently a strong predictor 
while verbal memory only approached significance. The current research also did not 
support a relationship between state anxiety, measured immediately after GSS 
administration, and suggestibility. This relationship has been documented in the past 
(Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995), but the lack of significant results in this analysis may be 
due to the strong relationship between cognitive ability and interrogative suggestibility.   
 FSIQ-E was the strongest predictor of both Total Suggestibility and Yield, and 
none of the decision-making tasks significantly predicted performance on any measure of 
the GSS. While the multicollinearity diagnostics did not indicate significant collinearity 
among predictors, it may be that FSIQ-E accounts for so much of the variability in the 
GSS measures, that any additional variance explained by decision-making tasks is 
statistically insignificant. This may also be due to the strong positive relationship 
between decision-making ability and intellectual ability noted in previous research. For 
example, performance on each of the six tasks of the ADMC was found to be related to 





on tasks similar to those of the ADMC have been found to positively correlate with  SAT 
score, Raven's matrices, and reading comprehension tasks (Stanovich & West, 1998).  
 Suggestibility is often differentiated from, but closely linked with, compliance 
and acquiescence. It may be that decision-making ability is more closely tied with 
compliance or acquiescence. Compliance does not include acceptance of the information 
as true, but it is the decision to comply with the information for secondary gain 
(Gudjonsson, 2003). Perhaps this process more closely relates to a decision-making 
process, in which the person must choose the course of action that will increase personal 
gain and decrease cost, and thus relies upon similar abilities. Acquiescence, as a 
personality trait consistent with submissiveness (Finlay & Lyons, 2001), may also be 
more closely tied with decision-making abilities as acquiescent individuals may show 
limits in certain decision-making skills that require independent thought such as assessing 
beliefs and values. 
 With FSIQ-E being such a strong predictor of suggestibility, it is possible that the 
relationship between intelligence and suggestibility is moderated by decision-making 
ability rather than decision-making ability having a direct relationship with suggestibility. 
The results of the interaction analysis indicate that one decision-making task significantly 
interacted with FSIQ-E to predict Total Suggestibility and Yield but not Shift scores. 
Consistency in Risk Perception moderates the relationship between FSIQ-E and Total 
Suggestibility so that FSIQ-E and Total Suggestibility are only related for those who 
perform at or above the mean on Consistency in Risk Perception. Intelligence is only 
predictive of suggestibility for those who consistently perceive risk; for those who do not 





 The same interaction was found for the prediction of yielding to misleading 
questions. Again, Consistency in Risk Perception acted as a moderator between FSIQ-E 
and Yield. The relationship between FSIQ-E and Yield was only significant for those 
who performed in the high range of Consistency in Risk Perception. Intelligence predicts 
the tendency to yield to misleading questions but only for those who most consistently 
perceive risk. This indicates that intelligence is not an important predictor of yielding to 
misleading questions for individuals who are average or poor at consistently perceiving 
risk.  
 Consistency in Risk Perception was the only decision-making task to interact with 
FSIQ-E to predict Suggestibility and Yield. As with the other decision-making tasks, 
Consistency in Risk Perception has been found to be related to cognitive ability (Bruine 
de Bruin et al., 2007). This task depends on the general decision-making skill of belief 
assessment which involves consistently judging the likelihood of outcomes. The specific 
task assesses the ability to follow probability rules.  
 Risk perception is important to the Gudjonsson-Clark model of interrogative 
suggestibility. According to this model, the interrogative situation is defined by a high 
degree of uncertainty that is related to the cognitive ability of the individual (Gudjonsson, 
2003). In this way, the results of the present study are consistent with the model; 
individuals with higher intelligence and better than average probability understanding, 
were less susceptible to suggestibility.  
 Coping strategies are another basic component of the Gudjonsson-Clark model. 
An individual's tendency toward suggestibility depends in part on the ability to generate 





been found to be related to a reduced tendency toward suggestibility in the context of 
uncertainty. Active-cognitive and active-behavioral coping strategies in which the 
individual actively manages thoughts and critically responds to the situation  have been 
related to reduced suggestibility while avoidance and emotion-focused coping in which 
the individual avoids criticism within the situation has been related to increased 
suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1988a; Howard & Hong, 2002).  
 Performance on the consistency in risk perception task has also been found to be 
related to certain decision-making styles, which are similar to coping strategies in a 
decision context. Specifically, risk perception has been positively correlated with 
behavioral coping and rational decision-making and negatively correlated with avoidance 
coping and spontaneous decision-making (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). It appears as 
though behavioral and rational strategies are important for success in both risk perception 
and suggestibility while avoidance strategies impair performance in both contexts. 
Perhaps individuals who are more intelligent and who also tend to use these cognitive and 
active-behavioral coping strategies more accurately perceive risk and are more consistent 
in their responses even in uncertain situations such as an interrogation. 
 Another possible explanation of the interaction between intelligence and risk 
perception in predicting suggestibility is that those who are both more intelligent and 
good at probability judgment do not feel the general reluctance to respond with 
uncertainty. Gudjonsson (2003) notes that people often believe they must provide a 
certain answer, but perhaps those who are intelligent and understand probability know 
that certainty is unlikely in regard to memory and are thus more likely to respond to 





individuals may be more aware of the actual probability related to their own memory 
ability and thus better able to cope with the unrealistic expectation that they should be 
more certain. It is the inconsistency between perceived probability or unrealistic 
expectations and actual probability that often results in poor risk perception (Slovic, 
Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).   
 The interaction may help explain why some studies have found range effects to 
impact the relationship between intelligence and suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 2003). For 
example, previous research has been mixed with some finding a relationship between 
intelligence and suggestibility only for those with average or below average intelligence 
(Gudjonsson, 1988b)  and others showing a relationship with the full range of scores 
(Søndenaa et al., 2010). The present sample had a representative range of FSIQ-E scores 
from 70 to 139, with a mean and standard deviation close to that of a normative sample 
(M=102 and SD= 13). Taking into consideration the interaction between FSIQ-E and 
Consistency in Risk Perception, this relationship is only consistent in predicting 
suggestibility and yield for average to above average intelligence. This may explain why 
some samples that only included higher intelligence scores and did not measure risk 
perception did not show the relationship between intelligence and suggestibility 
(Gudjonsson, 1988b). Analyses without variables that may moderate the relationship 
between intelligence and suggestibility, present an incomplete picture of the relationship 
between these variables.  
  Given previous and the present research, adequate measurement of intelligence 
and memory ability are important components of any assessment using the GSS for 





the individual's risk perception and understanding of risk. In the context of suggestibility 
and false confession, if the individual does not perceive the risk involved in the situation, 
perhaps he or she may be more likely to falsely confess. This would constitute poor 
decision-making as the negative consequences of falsely confessing to a crime are severe 
including the confessions impact on the interpretation of other evidence (Elaad et al., 
1994; Dror & Charlton, 2006), the testimony of the witnesses (Hasel & Kassin, 2009), 
and the increased likelihood of conviction (Bedau & Radelet, 1987; Garrett, 2011; 
Kassin, 2008).  
Limitations and Future Research 
 The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales were developed for a specific forensic 
application of determining an individual's tendency to be suggestible and potentially 
falsely confess to a crime in an interrogative situation. Thus, the scales were developed 
for use with a forensic sample. The present sample was limited to undergraduate students, 
most between the ages of 18 and 23. Recent research using cross-sectional data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 indicates that the risk of arrest by age 23 is 
about 30% (Brame, Bushway, Paternoster, & Turner, 2014). While the age range of the 
current sample is representative of the population with the highest arrest rates (Snyder & 
Mulako-Wangota, 2013), the current undergraduate sample is perhaps different in other 
ways including socioeconomic status, education level, gender, and other demographic 
variables. The undergraduate sample included a higher proportion of women compared to 
the forensic population in which men show substantially higher arrest rates than women 
across ages but also in the 18-24 year age range (Snyder & Mulako-Wangota, 2013; 





between the ages of 18 and 23 exhibit significantly higher cumulative arrest prevalence 
than white males of the same age range (Brame et al., 2014).  
 The current, predominately white female, sample misrepresents the ethnic 
diversity in a forensic sample. Future research about the relationship between 
suggestibility and decision-making should be conducted with a forensic sample. 
Preliminary analysis from a small sample of incarcerated individuals using the same 
protocol as the present study found that incarcerated individuals were more likely to 
respond to negative feedback by changing their answers to misleading questions and 
those who were highly suggestible performed worse on the decision-making tasks of 
Resistance to Framing and Applying Decision Rules (Ertelt et al., 2014).  
  The present study did not include personality or emotional predictors other than 
state anxiety, which was not a significant predictor of any measure from the GSS. 
Frumkin and colleagues (2012) found that Shift tends to be more closely associated with 
personality and emotional factors than Yield and Total Suggestibility, which is somewhat 
consistent with the present findings. Future research should further explore which 
personality traits are important for predicting the tendency to change answers in response 
to negative feedback. This would also be important for understanding suggestibility as a 
decision-making process, as personality features such as impulsivity and anxiety have 
been found to be related to both decision-making (Bensi et al., 2010; Maner et al., 2007; 
Miu et al., 2008) and suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1983; Gudjonsson, 1984c; Gudjonsson, 
1988a; Haraldsson, 1985; Smith & Gudjonsson, 1995; Wolfradt & Meyer, 1998).  
 Given the significant interaction between intelligence and risk perception in 





explore the relationship between probability judgment as it relates to suggestibility and 
risky behavior. The relationship between risk perception and risk behavior is complex. 
Greater risk perception is often related to protective behavior, but exposure to risky 
situations also decreases risk perception (Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, & Herrington, 2004). 
Increased risk taking behavior results in subsequent reduced risk perceptions (Brown, 
2005). The complex relationship may be due to the presentation and processing of the 
information. For example, eliciting specific memories of risky behaviors produces a 
positive correlation between risk perception and risk taking while eliciting gist, or global, 
non-specific, memories of risky behaviors produces a negative correlation between these 
constructs. Furthermore, viewing risk as relative, or contextual, is related to greater risky 
behavior than viewing risk as all-or-none, or global, which is negatively related to risky 
behavior (Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008). This indicates that an individual's risk 
perception is based on memories of past experiences, the type of risk-relevant memory 
cue (specific or global), and the individual's ability to recall previous specific experiences 
and global representations of risk. Within an interrogative situation, those who draw upon 
specific memories may be more likely to falsely confess (i.e. engage in the risky 
behavior) because their previous experiences indicate that the risk is low while those who 
draw on gist, or global, memories may be less likely to confess because their memories 
indicate that it is a risky behavior that should be avoided. Furthermore, those who 
frequently engage in risky behaviors that may place them in an interrogative situation 
may be more likely to falsely confess because they perceive the risk of consequences as 





relationship and its impact on an individual's tendency to falsely confess would be 
important for intervention at all levels. 
Conclusions 
 The primary results indicate that intellectual ability is highly predictive of 
suggestibility, specifically the tendency to yield to misleading information. Also, 
accuracy in risk perception appears to act as a moderating variable between intellectual 
ability and suggestibility. The results are based on a sample of undergraduate students, 
and thus are limited in their application to forensic populations. Future research should 
focus on suggestibility and decision-making ability within a forensic context. The results 
indicate need for adequate assessment of multiple facets of cognitive functioning when 
assessing individuals in supposed false confession cases. The current results point to the 
importance of adequate measurement of risk perception and intelligence in determining 
the individuals propensity to suggestibility. Understanding the individual’s perception of 
risk and general decision-making ability would be important for assessing the validity of 
their confession. Given the many detrimental legal consequences of false confessions 
(Kassin, 2008), it is important to consider the individual differences that would contribute 
to this phenomenon.    
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